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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISIS: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF AFRICAN UNION'S 









Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a troubling history of civil 
wars since gaining political independence from Belgium in 1960. All DRC's 
civil wars had external dimensions   who got involved to either defend 
ideological client or protect economic or strategic interests. The 1998 
unsuccessful attempt to oust President Laurent Kabila attracted two blocks of 
opposing multi-national forces into DRC. It was an instance of interference 
in internal affairs of DRC by neighbouring states and their allies. The status 
of pro-Kinsasha forces was clear in international law because they were 
invited by a legitimate government.  While that of anti-Kinsasha group 
cannot be situated within the ambit of any international law hence making 
their presence in DRC at the time of the civil war illegitimate.  Activities of 
anti-Kabila forces were not covered by AU's July 2000 principle of non-
indifference. Interference by foreign forces on the side of the rebel was a 
brazen act of aggression and flagrant disrespect for the territorial integrity of 
DRC. AU must act to safeguard abuse of the non-indifference clause by 
member states and stiffer sanctions imposed on belligerent actors. Their 
involvement prolonged the civil war and caused collapse of every state 
institution in DRC.  
 




Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one political entity in 
continental Africa with a troubling history of many civil wars and sundry 
forms of skirmishes with disastrous internal and trans-borders consequences. 
Barely two weeks of becoming a sovereign in June 1960, DRC experienced a 
mutiny that catalysed a chain of events that ended with a full-blown civil war 
and an attempted breakaway of mineral rich Katanga province. The first 
Congolese war rolled-off with a power tussle between the Marxist Prime 
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Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu. Cold War 
Ideological differences were piqued to be the root cause of the fracas 
between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. Through a high 
wired conspiracy between the Belgians, CIA, and the local defence forces 
Prime Minister Lumumba was arrested and killed in mysterious 
circumstances.  The first Congolese civil war  occurred at  the peak of the 
ideological war between the West and East, with former Superpowers 
(United States of America and former Union Of Soviet Socialists Republics) 
and their ideological club members pushing and pulling the strings through 
proxies in the Congo and neighbouring countries (BBC News November 
2012).  The Congolese early 60s war made history in multifaceted fronts: 
first, it was first of its kind in an independent country in the continental 
Africa; and two, the war gave birth to the first United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping mission since the creation of the global body after the Second 
World War in 1945. Sundry  narrations even  holds that Prime Minister 
Lumumba was killed while under the custody of United nations 
peacekeepers, a force he trusted much thereby throwing and any speck of 
doubt about their sincerity and neutrality to the wind. 
 After the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, 
President Kasavubu took hold of power but was unable to stabilise a country 
as large as the size of Western Europe with some of the world largest deposit 
of mineral resources. Congo is also blessed with rivers that can generate 
hydro power to the entire Africa and beyond. Added to these numerous 
natural endowments is the huge and talented population that has a large 
labour force for companies and agricultural sectors which employs more 
over 95% of the people in the Congo. Colliding and contradictory forces 
were so overwhelming for President Kasavubu to handled or stabilise. By 
1965 the boat of Kasavubu’s leadership in the Congo capsized through a 
coup by one Joseph Mobutu later Mobutu Sese Seko after his 1971 cultural 
revolution that saw changing of the name of persons, towns and even the 
country. Democratic Republic of Congo was baptized with a new name 
called Zaire as well as cities like Kisangani and Lubumbashi. Gen. Mobutu 
ruled the west Congo for 32yrs, a reign that was characterized by 
irredentism, predation, clientism, repression, and suppression of citizen’s 
fundamental human rights. Because of massive looting of public treasury 
during his years the word KLEPTOCRACY was specifically invented to 
describe naked and brazen acts of brigandism by Mobutu, members of his 
immediate family and top government officials. While pretending to be 
advancing the sense of nationalism, he also created a cult personality in the 
Congo (Oregun, 2002). 
 Pundits postulated that Mobutu tarried longer in power despite not 
providing total stability or respect for human rights because of the Cold War 
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politics that supports clients irrespective of their democratic or undemocratic 
credentials. Gen. Mobutu benefited from that ideological cover provided by 
the West who made him their man Friday not only within his region but in 
the entire black world. All his maladministration, abuses and predatory antics 
were brazenly disregarded by the West because in a Cold War situation such 
and allied undemocratic dispositions don’t constitutes an aberration so long 
as the long standing interest of curtailing the spread of communism in the 
continent is religiously observed. Added to this was unhindered access the 
kleptocrat had to facilities provided by world lending bodies like the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) along some bi-lateral facilities 
provided under sundry undercover policies and operations of CIA and their 
other Western security agencies (Pike, 2007).  The Western Man Friday 
violated trade and financial facilities conditionalities without attracting 
reprimand associated with violators of debt services. It was all bed of roses 
for Mobutu while the Cold War raged on because of the strategic interest he 
was protecting in his region and in African as a whole. 
 In 1991 the Cold War officially ended with the balkernization of 
USSR and adoption of liberal democracies of the WARSAW PACT 
countries of Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War triggered changes in 
foreign policies of the ideological war victors in tandem with the reigning 
ethos and tenets of liberal democracy. Clients like Mobutu Sese Seko were 
told to change course or rather avail themselves with realities of a post cold 
war world and relationships. This was too hard a nut to crack by chronic 
dictators like Mobutu and quite a bitter pill to swallow without grumbling. 
Gen. Mobutu was told in clear terms to expand the democratic space to 
accommodate other parties, respect human rights, cleanse the system of 
corruption and clientism, and other policies concomitant in a liberal 
democracy (Young, 1985). The maximum ruler of Zaire couldn’t breast up 
with conditions set up by people he spent his entire life protecting and 
advancing their interest. His resistance instigated a triple action from the 
United States, France and Belgium through withdrawal of their financial aid 
(Weiss, 2000). International financial institutions and donor agencies 
followed suit, thereby plunging the kleptocratic Mobutu and his Congo-Zaire 
into political and financial isolation. 
 Because of over three decades of economic mismanagement and the 
predatory abuse of public funds and state owned enterprises, the economy 
went on its knees (Richard and Christian, 2008). Mobutu the Western puppet 
was terribly crippled and became an embarrassment to international 
community that had supported his long reign in the Congo. At some points 
the despot was left in the eye of the storm because he was no longer an asset 
but a huge liability they can’t afford to continue to carry or shield. As 
Mobutu’s international support was diminishing his domestic foes increased 
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astronomically. Most of his adversaries were longstanding opposition leaders 
who kept his government on its toes right from the time he staged his coup in 
1965. 
 Understanding his unfortunate fate, democratic space expanders 
stepped up their advocacy by organising protests and rallies in support for 
democratic reforms in a one party political system that had been entrenched 
since 1965. Protests in defiance of police and military order became a 
constant drama frequently staged in the streets of cities like Kisangani, 
Kinshasa, and Lubumbashi. The situation went from bad to worst that even 
the ever loyal army joined the rank of protesters and mutinied (Adam, 2007).  
 As democratic forces engaged Mobutu’s government in the streets 
through sundry forms of civil disobedience his longest enemy and a diehard 
Lumumbaist Comrade Laurent Desire Kabila was assembling combatants 
with the support of his DRC’s two neighbours Uganda and Rwanda 
(Bangura,1999). Kabila’s two backers didn’t only provide logistic support 
but gave his fighters instructors and advisers who guided the troops from 
Goma and Kivu provinces bordering their countries down to Kinshasa. The 
speed at which the forces matched to Kinshasa was unbelievable because of 
the sheer size of the country, poor road networks and infrastructures. There 
were very few functional airports or airstrips to facilitate speedy projection 
of forces from very far flanks to Kinshasa. Captured areas where there were 
such facilities, they are unusable due to long years of neglect by Mobutu’s 
armies and commanders. Non repairs or keeping of functional bases was 
considered a deliberate ploy by Mobutu to cripple the military might vis a vis 
his special forces carefully drawn and trained to safeguard the regime. Gen. 
Kabila and his rebels matched down Kinshasa without firing a single shot 
and were welcomed by hundreds of thousands of cheering citizens of the 
capital city. 
 Because of the nature of his emergence and multiple security 
challenges associated with managing the country and the city of Kinshasa, 
President Kabila officially handed over some sensitive physical and 
administrative security management of the country to Rwandans and 
Ugandan military personnel that walked the troop up to victory. Their 
legality at that point was not in doubt because their presence was recognised 
by a legitimate government of a sovereign nation. After a while their 
presence started eroding the popularity of Kabila’s government especially in 
Kinshasa. People started questioning the entire concept of the liberation song 
sung by President Kabila while fighting Mobutu and advancing to the capital 
city, their presence was viewed as replacing a local dictator with foreign 
ones. The most irritating aspect of it all to residence of Kinshasa is the 
realisation that these military officers came from very tiny political enclaves 
that their sizes and potentials can’t be compared to one single region of 
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DRC. The foreign military advisors themselves did not help matters because 
they behaved unruly to the people they helped liberate from the clutches of 
Mobutu’s dictatorship. 
 Another factor that angered the Congolese was occupation of 
strategic political offices by friends and allies of Rwandan and Ugandan 
governments and all of them Tutsis. President Kabila a Tutsi was appointed 
the leader of Alliance des Forces Pur la Democratic du Congo (AFDL) the 
ruling party. Others were appointed to head ministry of foreign affairs, 
secretary of the ruling coalition, Vice Governor, Mayor of Bukavu, and 
Governor of North Kivu. Majority of the Congolese who were not Tutsi 
ethnic nationalities saw a gradual replay of Tutsis domineering tendencies 
everywhere they found themselves. Others started raising questions 
regarding their having more than enough fair share of government’s 
positions despite their identity crisis (Danfulani, 2011). 
 At a point it became clear to President Kabila that he must decide to 
either continue to accommodate foreign friends that supported him or tell his 
advisors thank you, but it is time to go home. Before making a final decision 
on this he signed military ties with China, Angola, and Zimbabwe to enable 
him build a force of over 600000 combatants that will provide internal and 
external security to the entire nation (Baregu, 2002). To get additional 
security cover he joined Southern African Development Association, his 
joining gave him other collective security privileges member states were 
enjoying. After taking such measures, President Kabila sacked his foreign 
military advisors and told them to leave the country to their countries of 
origin (Lannote, 2005) 
 Angered by an action they viewed as ungrateful, Rwanda and Uganda 
immediately formed another rebel group to oust President Kabila in a similar 
manner they helped Kabila dethrone Mobutu. Their strategic plan did not 
differ with the one they had during their first mission. Gen. James Kabarehe 
that was sacked and directed home by Kabila commanded an airborne 
operation, weapons and ammunitions from Goma to Kitona with the sole aim 
of launching a flash-war operation that would dethrone Kabila in a matter of 
days. The operation was launched under the banner of Congolese Rally for 
Democracy. A few days after commencing the operations, they realised that 
it takes more than their imagination to execute their war plan and it is bad 
strategic and tactical philosophy to repeat the same strategy in two different 
campaigns. 
 Aside the strategic blunder there was the issue of lack of popular 
support by the new Congolese Rally for Democracy from native Congolese. 
A fierce propaganda was launched by Kinshasa against the rebel and the 
propaganda massaged the ego of majority of Congolese who believe that 
Rwanda and Uganda are too small states that should have no business trying 
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to dictate the pace of political events in a big Congo. The Lack of support 
from locals in campaigns that were like guerrilla warfare is the surest avenue 
to defeat or lack of achieving the objective of the campaign. 
 Apart from lack of support and strategic lameness there is the issue of 
intervention from Angolan and Zimbabwean armed forces who came in on 
invitation of Kinshasa and through military ties entered at the verge of the 
sacking of Ugandan and Rwandan military advisors. Angolan and 
Zimbabwean fighters along with their Congolese counterparts halted 
advances of the rebels towards the capital and froze their advance beyond 
territories captured before their full involvement. Not long after that 
Namibia, Chad Republic and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement joined 
the Kinshasa group and formed a large multinational force in the Congo. 
Rally for Congolese Democrats also invited friendly states like Burundi and 
Dr. Jonas Sawinbi’s UNITA join them in the battle. These two formations 
assembled from armed forces of many nations made an analyst to describe 
the civil war in the Congo first African World War. Along with these 
countries and bigger rebel groups are many local groups who are fighting or 
supporting one of the two grand formations.  
 Massive international and internal involvement threw spanner in the 
entire game plan of anti Kinshasa groups. Disagreement suddenly surfaced 
between the two major backers of the rebel group that is Rwanda and 
Uganda. It went so bad that the group balkanised to two rebel groups, one 
under Rwandan control while the other under Uganda. They groups were 
RCD Goma and RCD Kisangani. There were instances where the two groups 
left their common foe and engaged themselves in fierce battle with full 
involvement and command of their headquarters in Kampala and Kigali. 
This totally sealed their hope of victory and installing their stooge in 
Kinshasa as president and commander in chief of Congolese armed forces. 
 Pro and anti Kinshasa military campaigns deadlocked without either 
side achieving the goal of total defeat of their opponents. Much of the 
negative consequences of the deadlock was in the camp of anti Kinshasa 
formation because at junction the world’s attention has been drawn to the 
human suffering through large Internally Displaced Persons ( IDP) and 
refugee camps in and outside the country as the case may be. The world 
community got to know about events and actors in the Congo because of 
information supplied by activities of numerous local and international Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in the country as well as 
reports of host countries of hundreds of thousands of refugees that fled DRC 
because of the war and abuse of rights by foreign combatants and kids 
soldiers the two camps recruited or conscripted into their armed forces 
(OXFAM, 2001). 
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 At the end anti Kinshasa group couldn’t achieve their ultimate 
mission of dethroning the regime of President Laurent Kabila  but the 
president himself lost his life through the bullet of an aide on 2000 while 
preparing for a foreign summit. The assassin couldn’t live to face trial and 
possibly confess on whose mission he acted because he had been a long-time 
aide of Kabila. Like most high profile assassinations that assailants do not 
live to face trial, Kabila’s murder has been surrounded with conflicting 
conspiracy theories  that some don’t tally with commonsense and logic. His 
friends especially Angola and foes Uganda and Rwanda have all been 
accused of the plot that annihilated President Kabila. After much diplomatic 
talk amongst and between the pro Kinshasa groups who are charged with the 
security of the seat of power and other sensitive areas, the murdered leader’s 
son Gen. Joseph Kabila, a commander in one of the regions away from 
Kinshasa was called and handed over the power to lead the nation. 
 
United Nations mediation effort 
On assuming power young Kabila embarked on and adopted a 
different approach from his father on how to quell the crisis in the Congo. 
His father’s hawkish disposition was replaced with subtle diplomacy and 
invitation to the combatants to come to a negotiating table. That triggered 
resolved by the Kisangani based rebel groups under Prof Wamba dia Wamba 
and supported by Uganda to freeze action and begin to adopt a receptive 
attitude to talks and peaceful resolution. The same call for peace by the 
government could not generate a similar reaction on the part of RCD Goma 
under Jean Pear Bemba, a group strongly under the control of Kigali 
(Lonatte, 2003). 
 President Kabila’s willingness to talk and positive response by a 
faction of his opponents paved a way for moves by key players in the region 
like United States, France and Belgium to set-in-motion peacemaking 
sessions through United Nations.  The French were instrumental to Security 
Council Resolution 1304 that ordered uninvited forces to withdraw from the 
Congo. The French sponsored resolution was subjected to hot debate by 
others that all foreign troops irrespective of on whose invitation they came to 
the Congo. But the French position was adopted on simple logic and 
commonsense that any force invited by a legitimate government via a bi-
lateral or multilateral agreement, are legitimate guests. Since the second 
camp were not invited by Kinshasa that made their involvement illegal and 
affected by the French sponsored resolution. Resolution 1304 inflicted legal 
and moral crises in Rwandan, Uganda and Burundi forces in the Congo. And 
when such allied campaigns are resolved to be illegal through resolution of 
United Nations Security Council it dampens morale of fighters and also 
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make the political leadership thread with caution because of the likely 
repercussions their non conformance might generate. 
 United Nations initial effort ended with another resolution to send a 
small contingency troop of 5537 consisting of mainly French clients in 
Africa. For a country the size of Western Europe without a serious peace 
agreement on ground, a military contingency of 5537 is absurd. The small 
troop can’t even manned major streets of Kinshasa. When crises happens in 
Africa United Nation’s response is usually slow and when they want to act 
they act as if they were forced to take such actions. The same thing happened 
in Liberia and Serria Leone in West Africa, Nigeria had to mobilise sister 
States and formed Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) to restore order in those two nations. Much of such 
lackadaisical action was displayed during the Rwandan crisis between 
majority Hutus and Minority Tutsis in the early 90s. United Nations refused 
to act until the crisis degenerated to genocide by Hutu Extremists against 
their fellow moderate Hutus and minority Tutsis.  However if similar 
incidences happens elsewhere, they are quick to intervene, a good case to 
support this allegations was how they intervened in crises that erupted in 
Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. When former Yugoslavia 
disintegrated into many independent political units, and ethno-religious 
crises broke out United Nations key players especially the veto power 
holding monsters influenced many resolutions within the body and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation into mobilising nations to act against Serbia. 
Their timely intervention minimized the human calamity in the Balkans. 
 
African unions policy of non-indifference 
Organisation of African Unity later African Union played a role in 
ceasing arms confrontation in the Congo through the Lusaka peace Talks 
with the warring factions. That came after the United Nations had wadded 
into the conflict through the body’s Security Council.  Among the various 
initiatives embarked by the African Union only two were remarkable and led 
to a breakthrough in tackling the crisis in the Congo viz the SIRTE and 
LUSAKA summits (Danfulani, 2011).  The two Summits actually recorded 
successes because they created opportunities for the warring factions to 
begin a series of dialogues on how to resolve the crisis that had attracted 
armed forces of many countries in the Congo. African Union could not 
record instant ceasing of hostilities and observance of a major resolution 
which is foreign troop’s withdrawal in Congo but the involvement of the 
body in peacemaking effort is a major shift in its principle of non-
interference with internal affairs of member states. 
 A re-think of Africa Union’s principle of indifference was 
necessitated by the 1994 Rwandan civil war that ended with genocide of 
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almost a million Tutsis by Hutus Interehenwe fighters. When the crisis 
started the whole continent looked the other way despite clear signs of gross 
violations of human rights and features of ethnic cleansing. After the crisis 
was over through overthrow of the Hutu regime by Rwandan patriotic Front 
of Gen. Paul Kagame, African Union formed an investigation panel to look 
into the genocide claims and the panel indeed confirmed most of the claims 
and tactically indicted neighbouring countries for not acting or drawing the 
attention of the world to the pogrom in Rwanda. 
 However the shift of the philosophy of indifference to non-
indifference was officialised in February of 2004 under a constitutive act of 
the union. The right to intervene as stipulated in the constitutive act comes in 
two way: One, the body can wade into a crisis on request of the government 
of any member state, and  Two, they can intervene without invitation if they 
are sure of gross violation of human rights and other calamities. The 
circumstances that could mastermind intervention were enumerated in 
chapter for (h) and (j) of the act.  
 This constitutive Act of African Union have been subjected to many 
legal interpretations vis a vis other global protocols, especially powers 
invested on United nations Security Council as the only body charged with 
authorization to deploy forces to enforce or make peace in any troubled part 
of the world(Kioko,2003). Areas bordering enforcement is a sole schedule 
embedded in the functions of Security Council can be found in chapter VII 
of United Nations Charter. References have been made to operation by North 
Atlantic Treaty organisation (NATO) in Kosovo and Economic Community 
of West Africa State (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  These two 
operations were not ordered by United Nations but very little condemnations 
were heard. The curious fact is the NATO’s operations because three out of 
the five permanent members of the Security Council members are NATO’s 
members and took frontal roles in the operations of the body. That of 
ECOWAS was purely a sub-regional initiative masterminded by Nigeria to 
curtail crisis in some of its member’s state. 
 Apart from legal questions raised by African Union’s non-
indifference Act the issue of territorial sovereignty came up for analyses. 
Scholars also took time advancing how the entire concept of sovereignty 
suffered setback and lost its original meaning and feature. Kioko quoted 
Collier and Sturman like this: “the concept of Sate sovereignty, on which 
international system and the OAU were founded, presumes that each state 
has the power, authority and competence to govern its territory. For many 
African States, however, sovereignty is a legal fiction that is not matched by 
governance and administrative capacity”. The narration is neither here nor 
there because it talks of the generally known assumption and the reality of 
African States.  
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 The war in focus started before the African Union invented the 
principle of right to intervene on invitation or otherwise in affairs of member 
states on humanitarian grounds or stopping of gross violations of human 
rights. If the law was on ground before the war, there is no doubt it would 
have helped in tackling the crisis right before degenerating to what some 
called African World War. It would have encouraged others to openly 
mobilise for intervention through the relevant organ of African Union, but 
lack of it made states steer clear for fear of found wanting of violating a long 
standing principle of respect for territorial integrity of member states.  
 However I believe that even if the non-indifference law was there, the 
political will and other logistic problems would have overwhelmed the 
mission. On political will, strategic states like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Zimbabwe, Chad, Namibia and Angola were already participants in the war. 
They are large enough to polarise any attempt to sponsor a motion in the 
relevant organ of the body that will warrant sending of troops to the Congo. 
This point can be supported by the sharp disagreement on the Chief mediator 
of the crisis; the Congolese government were not ready to accept any person 
except that person has a French touch or background.  
 Another hard one will be finances and logistics because Congo is 
such a large country that only two to three hundred thousand troops can 
effectively enforce or make peace. With such a huge force, who will pick the 
bills? There is no doubt that African Union would not have been able to 
mobilise resources and men to breast up with such a mission. Closely related 
to this is, the peacemakers or enforcement contingents must cover all the 
nooks and crannies of the Congo consequent to the fact that no regions is 
free of conflicting groups fighting themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
 African Union’s philosophical shift from indifference to non-
indifference has altered a long standing principle and engineered debates that 
were approached from legalistic and moralistic angles. African Union’s 
Institutive Act of 2004 also challenged the traditional perception of 
sovereignty and sanctity of respecting territory of member States. Beyond 
the legalistic approach it is a welcome development because of avalanche of 
political instability in Africa. The only point desiring stressing is putting 
enough mechanism to making sure that the Act is deployed in instances 
where developments meets set criteria for intervention. Recent senseless 
ethno-religious killing in Central African Republic is a good case where non-
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